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Abstract: Everyone knows what David Lewis’ possible worlds are, what role they play in his account of possibility and necessity, and Saul Kripke’s criticisms. But what, instead, are Kripke’s possible worlds, and what role do they play in his account of possibility and necessity? The answers are not so obvious. Recently, it has even been claimed that, contrary to what is standardly assumed, Kripke’s approach to modality has not always been consistently metaphysical. In particular, an interpretation of the famous passage in the preface to Naming and Necessity with Kripke’s discussion of the dice example has been put forward, according to which he purports there to clarify the modal notions in terms of that of possible world, model-theoretically construed, in a way which is reminiscent of Carnap’s. In this paper, I shall point out some internal difficulties of this interpretation, and offer a different one, according to which in the dice passage Kripke is trying, consistently with his metaphysical approach, to legitimize the technically useful notion of possible world starting from modal notions, to be accounted for in another way (arguably, in an essentialistic framework). My final goal, however, will be philosophical elucidation rather than mere exegesis. Indeed, I am interested in shedding some light on what possible worlds might possibly be, if something like Kripke’s metaphysical approach is on the right track.

Saul Kripke’s Naming and Necessity is commonly acknowledged as the text that has revived the notion of metaphysical necessity and the doctrine of essentialism in 20th century philosophy. Without denying this, Roberta Ballarin has recently claimed that things are a little more complicated.​[1]​ Indeed, according to her way of reading Naming and Necessity, Kripke wavers between two different conceptual frameworks, or two different ways of interpreting modality, which are in an “inherent tension” (Ballarin 2004, p. 620). She dubbed them “the Model Theory as an Interpretation” (MTI) and “the Metaphysical Necessity Interpretation” (MNI). The latter is the one which I take to be standardly attributed to Kripke (though, strangely, Ballarin seems to think otherwise). The former would instead be the heir of a tradition on this topic that can be traced back to Rudolf Carnap. More specifically, Ballarin ascribes to Kripke an “ambivalent attitude” (p. 628 n. 37) with regard to the relation between his formal semantics for modal languages and the philosophical explanation of modality. According to MNI, the formal work, though useful, is solely that – a formal work – and the notion of possible world it employs is not much more than a (legitimate, as we shall see) technical notion.​[2]​ According to MTI, on the contrary, both the work and the notion, when properly understood, offer the basis for a “reductive analysis” (Ballarin 2004, p. 627) of modal talk.
Now, while I agree with the gist of Ballarin’s paper, which is meant to argue that, of the two frameworks, only MNI properly answers the problem of interpreting modal logic, famously raised by Willard V. Quine,​[3]​ I am rather baffled by her charging Kripke with ambivalence. In fact, I have not been able to find any sign of a proclivity for MTI in Naming and Necessity. In what follows, after briefly presenting Ballarin’s reconstruction of both MTI and MNI, I shall consider the famous passage in the preface to the book with Kripke’s discussion of the dice example, which she takes as a “paradigm passage” (p. 620) of MTI, and argue that it can, and should, be read as supporting MNI instead. Since this is the only textual evidence produced by Ballarin, I shall conclude that no good reason has been offered for attributing any wavering between different conceptual frameworks, nor any “ambivalent attitude”, to Kripke.​[4]​ My concerns, however, will not be merely exegetical. Indeed, by dealing with these issues I also hope to shed some light on the thorny question of what possible worlds might possibly be, if something like MNI is the right approach to modality.
According to Ballarin, the “fundamental tenets” of MTI are:

(a) All the model theoretically consistent combinations are possible.
(b) The objects of the set theoretic models – both individuals and worlds – are either bare particulars or bundles of qualities.
(c) We practice what Quine might have called “semantic descent” – the metalanguage span of structures (needed to analyze validity) is projected down to determine the intended interpretation of the object language ‘□’.
(d) The spread of model theoretically calculated possibilities for x is logically prior to x’s actual state [Footnote appended: More strongly, the possibilities are, in a sense, the same for all individuals].
(e) Being logically prior to x’s actual state, x’s model theoretical possibilities are epistemologically prior to information about x’s actual state, hence known a priori.
(f) Bare Haecceitism, that is, qualitatively identical but numerically distinct individuals and worlds, becomes possible.
(g) All necessities and possibilities have a de dicto source [Footnote appended: The model theory is first and foremost a way of evaluating sentences. The logical possibility of Nixon’s being a turnip ultimately rests on the consistency of ‘Nixon is a turnip’] (p. 626).

Some of these tenets, though interesting in themselves, are not relevant to our discussion. As Ballarin shows, however, all of them are more or less direct consequences of the first, which enacts a combinatorial interpretation of modality. The basic idea is simple: take any individual and any non-logical monadic property (or, more generally, any n-tuple of individuals and any non-logical relation), put them together, and you will get a possibility, because you will find a world where this synthesis is realized. And this is so, as (g) states, because worlds are, in a sense that is perhaps difficult to specify, a by-product of language.​[5]​ Every time you have a consistent sentence (‘Nixon is a turnip’, for example), you have a sentence which is true in a world, and thus possibly true. According to MTI, then, Nixon could have been a turnip. As a corollary, the only sentences that turn out to be necessarily true are those whose denial is logically inconsistent: ‘Everything is human or not human’, or perhaps ‘Nixon is human or not human’, but certainly not ‘Nixon is human’. That is to say that no substantial form of essentialism emerges if one adopts the MTI conceptual framework. Finally, granted that logic is knowable a priori, all the existing necessities are knowable a priori (see (e)).​[6]​
The “characteristic features” of MNI are instead:

(a) Model theoretical consistency is not in itself sufficient for possibility – not even for logical possibility.
(b) The objects of a metaphysical interpretation are real objects, neither bare particulars nor bundles of qualities.
(c) Bare Haecceitism is excluded.
(d) We practice no “semantic descent” – a direct interpretation of the object language ‘□’ is our starting point.
(e) x’s actual state is logically prior to x’s real span of possibilities.
(f) Being logically posterior to x’s actual state, x’s real possibilities are epistemologically posterior to information about x’s actual state.
(g) All necessities and possibilities are ultimately de re (where the res might be an individual, a species, a property, and the like) (Ballarin 2004, pp. 636-637).

Here too the basic idea is simple. Instead of hiding behind a technical apparatus, let us take modality seriously and try to understand it for what it is (see (d)). Now, according to MNI, actuality, so to speak, comes first (e). It offers us a world inhabited by res, that is by individuals, species, and properties (b). It is precisely in them (where else?) that modal properties are rooted (g). What is Nixon? A man. Indeed, being a man is one of his essential properties (as being a politician is not). If this is so, he could not have been a turnip, because being a man precludes the possibility of being a turnip.​[7]​ Therefore, as (a) makes clear, not every consistent sentence is possibly true, and conversely, it is not the case that the denial of every necessarily true sentence is inconsistent. In order to discover possibilities and necessities, we have to investigate the real world: contrary to what Carnap, and Kant before him, thought, many of them can only be known a posteriori (f).
Now, on the one hand this rough sketch of both frameworks should be sufficient to cause any reader even slightly familiar with Naming and Necessity to look upon it as a clear and coherent, though certainly incomplete, articulation of the second (MNI). On the other hand, however, note that, in the characterization of the latter, no mention has been made of possible worlds. This seems reasonable: if modal properties are rooted in actual res, why should we call possible worlds into the picture? But, if this is so, where does all Kripke’s talk about them come from?
Ballarin’s startling answer is: from MTI. Indeed, as I said, she claims to have found clear traces of it in Naming and Necessity. Indicted, in particular, is a long passage clarifying the notion of possible world that Kripke included in his 1980 preface to the book and that Ballarin sees as no less than “promulgating a paradigm of the MTI approach to the understanding of necessity” (Ballarin 2004, p. 626). In order to facilitate the discussion, I reproduce here the most relevant parts of it.

[T]here are some conceptions of ‘possible worlds’ that I repudiate and some I do not. An analogy from school – in fact, it is not merely an analogy – will help to clarify my view. Two ordinary dice (call them die A and die B) are thrown, displaying two numbers face up. For each die, there are six possible results. Hence there are thirty-six possible states of the pair of dice, as far as the numbers shown face-up are concerned, though only one of these states corresponds to the way the dice actually will come out. We all learned in school how to compute the probabilities of various events (assuming equiprobability of the states). For example, since there are just two states – (die A, 5; die B, 6) and (die A, 6; die B, 5) – that yield a total throw of eleven, the probability of throwing eleven is 2/36 = 1/18.
Now in doing these school exercises in probability, we were in fact introduced at a tender age to a set of (miniature) ‘possible worlds’. The thirty-six possible states of the dice are literally thirty-six ‘possible worlds’, as long as we (fictively) ignore everything about the world except the two dice and what they show (and ignore the fact that one or both dice might not have existed). Only one of these miniworlds – the one corresponding to the way the dice in fact come up – is the ‘actual world’, but the others are of interest when we ask how probable or improbable the actual outcome was (or will be).... The thirty-six possibilities, the one that is actual included, are (abstract) states of the dice ....
‘Possible worlds’ are little more than the miniworlds of school probability blown large. It is true that there are problems in the general notion not involved in the miniature notion. The miniature worlds are tightly controlled, both as to the objects involved (two dice), the relevant properties (number on face shown), and (thus) the relevant idea of possibility. ‘Possible worlds’ are total ‘ways the world might have been’, or states or histories of the entire world. To think of the totality of all of them involves much more idealization, and more mind-boggling questions, than the less ambitious elementary school analogue. Certainly the philosopher of ‘possible worlds’ must take care that his technical apparatus not push him to ask questions whose meaningfulness is not supported by our original intuitions of possibility that gave the apparatus its point.... For present purposes, however, the elementary analogue gives a fine model for the appropriate morals regarding ‘possible worlds’. There is nothing wrong in principle with taking these, for philosophical or for technical purposes, as (abstract) entities – the innocence of the grammar school analogue should allay any anxieties on that score (Kripke 1980, pp. 16-19).

As I have already mentioned, according to Ballarin “Kripke’s discussion of the dice rests on the logical-model theoretic notion of possibility” (Ballarin 2004, p. 623). In her interpretation, in order to explain modal notions, he is trying, with the aid of this example, to clarify the notion of possible world, and, even worse, he is doing so by appealing to arbitrary combinations. In fact,

Kripke starts with two objects (die A and die B) and six properties (showing number 1, or 2, and so on). A and B together with the six properties generate 36 possible outcomes....
... Kripke is making use ... of the Stipulability of Modal Predicates. In calculating 36 possible outcomes for A and B, Kripke relies on a stipulative maximum principle for possibility – any combinatorial arrangement of the dice is deemed possible (pp. 621-622).

More generally, the approach would be quasi-Carnapian (the qualification is mine):

We take some given objects and properties.... Next, we apply the Stipulability of Modal Predicates principle – all the combinations of object-property pairs are declared possible. Notice that in proclaiming all such states as possible, we proceed purely a priori, before we know anything more – actual empirical facts – about the objects and the properties in question (p. 622).​[8]​

From this, moreover, other features of MTI follow. Firstly, the dice would be bare particulars, open to any possibility. Secondly, there would be numerically distinct but qualitatively identical worlds (as Bare Haecceitism claims): for example, the world where die A shows number 5 and die B number 6, and the world where A shows 6 and B 5 (p. 623).
Is Ballarin right about all this? I believe she is not. In what follows, I shall highlight some problems regarding her interpretation and then try to present a substantially different reading of the indicted passage from the preface to Naming and Necessity.
In order to be more precise, let us do things in an even more Carnapian way, by devising a first-order artificial language to study the dice case. Given that, as Kripke says and Ballarin repeats, there are two objects and six properties involved, eight extralogical symbols are needed: two individual constants (let say, ‘a’ and ‘b’) and six monadic predicates (‘P1’, ‘P2’, ‘P3’, ‘P4’, ‘P5’, and ‘P6’). As a consequence, the language has twelve atomic sentences: ‘P1 a’, ‘P2 a’, ‘P3 a’, ‘P4 a’, ‘P5 a’, ‘P6 a’, ‘P1 b’, ‘P2 b’, ‘P3 b’, ‘P4 b’, ‘P5 b’, and ‘P6 b’. Now, we may ask: How many state-descriptions (and so, how many relevant mini possible worlds) are there? The answer, which requires a simple combinatorial calculation, is: 4096 (212).​[9]​ How is it, then, that Kripke writes that “there are thirty-six possible states of the pair of dice, as far as the numbers shown face-up are concerned”? Did he miscalculate? Not at all, of course. The fact is that we have to discard all those state-descriptions which contain more than one atomic sentence regarding a, all those which contain more than one atomic sentence regarding b, all those which contain no atomic sentence regarding a, and finally all those which contain no atomic sentence regarding b. Any state-description which contains ‘P1 a’, for example, must contain ‘¬P2 a’, ‘¬P3 a’, ‘¬P4 a’, ‘¬P5 a’, and ‘¬P6 a’; and no state-description can contain ‘¬P1 a’, ‘¬P2 a’, ‘¬P3 a’, ‘¬P4 a’, ‘¬P5 a’, and ‘¬P6 a’ together. Note that there are only 36 state-descriptions conforming to these additional principles. Now, any state-description which does not conform to them cannot be taken as representing a (mini) possible world (or, at least, in view of his answer, this seems to be what Kripke thinks). Why? Simply because it is (deemed by him) impossible for a die to show more, or less, than one number face-up. The point is obvious, but it has important consequences for the issue we are interested in. Indeed, Kripke’s pruning of the state-descriptions cannot be justified by logical (model theoretic) considerations. As a matter of fact, all of the 4096 state-descriptions are equally consistent. If 4060 of them are deemed by Kripke to be inadequate, the reason must be another. We should at least begin to suspect that it is metaphysical – grounded in what (he thinks) a die is –, and thus that the spread of possibilities is, so to speak, actuality, rather than language-driven. However, let me put off the elaboration of this, and just note that here Kripke already seems to be working outside the MTI framework, since he is disallowing the first and most basic of its tenets, the one which states, in Ballarin’s words, that “all the model theoretically consistent combinations are possible”.
To make the problem more vivid, let us now extend our artificial language with a new predicate, ‘P7’, expressing the property of showing number 7 face-up. From a logical point of view, the extension is fully legitimate. There are now 14 atomic sentences, 16384 state-descriptions, and 49 state-descriptions surviving a pruning similar to the one above. But how many possible states of the pair of dice are there, as far as the numbers shown face-up are concerned? I do not know Kripke’s answer, but I do not see any reason to suppose it would be different from the one any reasonable person would give: 36 again (not 49!).​[10]​ At least in this case, the extension of language does not seem to bring about an increment of the possibilities. A total throw of fourteen continues to be an impossible outcome. Why is it so? Because it is still (deemed) impossible for a die (of the relevant kind) to show number 7 face-up, despite the fact that ‘P7 a’and ‘P7 b’ are now consistent sentences of our language. The reason, again, cannot be model theoretical. Once more, Kripke seems to be working outside MTI (as, I would submit, any probability theory scholar does).
Perhaps, I should add that the above argument can be generalized, in that it can be shown that the problem is not contingent on our specific choice of language. Indeed, we can let our opponent freely devise a first-order artificial language to deal with the dice case. Whatever this turns out to be, that is, whatever individual constants and predicates occur in its atomic sentences, we can be sure that exactly 36 state-descriptions will not be obtained, as would be required, for the simple reason that there is no n such that 2n = 36.
Actually, a simple objection could be advanced against this argument. Certainly, not only Kripke but also Carnap would have answered ‘36’ to our question, and it is difficult to attribute a metaphysical approach to him either. As a first reply, I stress again that the answer is nevertheless incompatible with his account of modality in Meaning and Necessity, as he himself realized some years later.​[11]​ As a consequence, he was forced to introduce into his frame what he called ‘meaning postulates’ to delimit the range of the admissible state-descriptions. The idea is simple: working with an artificial language such as the one we have devised, we give a special status to some of its sentences, and we decide that only those state-descriptions in which these sentences hold represent possible worlds. In our case, for example, to solve the second problem we have discussed, such a special status could be assigned to ‘x ¬P7 x’. The first can also be addressed, in an only slightly more complex way. Now, it could be observed that this solution does seem to be free of any metaphysical commitment. If this is so, the objector can ask why we should not take Kripke’s indicted passage as approaching modality in a similar way, thus somehow relegitimizing Ballarin’s reading. Against this line of defence, I would put forward three considerations. Firstly, we must notice that Carnap’s appeal to meaning postulates consists of a substantial departure from MTI (though still preserving some of its features).​[12]​ In particular, the Stipulability of Modal Predicates principle, which Ballarin sees as being at the core of MTI, ceases to be valid – now, for example, the combination of the object A with the property of showing number 7 face-up would not be declared possible. Secondly, after Quine’s well-known attack on the notion of analyticity, the role which meaning postulates can play is quite controversial. Certainly, we can give a special status to some of the sentences of an artificial language, as Carnap claims. But the crucial question is: Why give this special status to these sentences rather than to others – for example, to ‘x ¬P7 x’ rather than to ‘x P7 x’ and\or ‘x ¬P6 x’?​[13]​ Carnap’s startling answer was that “[t]his is not a matter of knowledge but of decision” (Carnap 1952, p. 225). Someone else, not convinced by Quine, could try to appeal to semantical facts concerning natural language – in our case, the English word ‘die’. In my opinion, however, the most promising strategy to justify the choice is to say that those sentences somehow reflect the nature of a die, by spelling out what a die is. Unfortunately, if this is so, then, contrary to the intention of the objector, metaphysics forcefully reappears as an important component of the attempt to account for modality. Thirdly and lastly, there are, I think, even fewer reasons to read Kripke’s indicted passage as being based on something like meaning postulates than as supporting the original MTI approach. As a matter of fact, the passage undoubtedly has a combinatorial flavor, which I shall discuss below. On the contrary, no appeal whatsoever seems to be made in it to the meaning of any word.​[14]​
To the argument I have outlined so far, I wish to add only a couple of minor considerations which seem to go against Ballarin’s reading. The first is textual. In a sentence that I intentionally omitted from the indicted passage in my reproduction of it, Kripke explicitly denies a thesis which constitutes another fundamental tenet of MTI and which Ballarin attributes to him. Indeed, he writes:

[I]n setting up this innocent little exercise regarding the fall of the dice, with possibilities that are not described purely qualitatively, we make no obscure metaphysical commitment to dice as ‘bare particulars’, whatever that might mean (Kripke 1980, pp. 17-18).​[15]​

The second is, so to speak, hermeneutical. Before reading a passage in a text as contradicting more or less everything else which is written in it, a principle of charity should move us to find other interpretations. Only when these are barred, is the reading in question justifiable. Indeed, with regard to our case, in my opinion another interpretation is possible. It makes Naming and Necessity absolutely coherent, by reading the dice passage as plainly supporting MNI. In what follows, I shall try to outline it briefly.
According to Ballarin’s interpretation, Kripke, with his discussion of the dice example, is trying, among other things, to explain modal notions by means of the notion of possible world, model-theoretically, namely combinatorially, construed. According to my reading, on the contrary, he is trying to legitimize the notion of possible world, so useful from a technical point of view as well as in characterizing rigid designation,​[16]​ starting from modal notions, previously grounded in that of essence.​[17]​ In other words, possible worlds would be the explanandum, possibility, elsewhere explained, the explanans. It is as if Kripke were saying to the reader, suspicious of all that obscure talk about possible worlds: if you agree that objects have possibilities (and you had better agree), you should not worry about possible worlds, because, as the dice example should help you see, they are (not distant planets but) nothing more than constructions out of possibilities.
Thus, rather than arbitrary combinations of objects and properties induced by language, as in Ballarin’s reading (recall the Stipulability of Modal Predicates principle), at the basis there are (non-arbitrary) possibilities of objects, flowing from their nature or essence. I see Kripke clearly making this point in the opening of his discussion of the dice case. There, he does not say: Let us take these two objects and these six properties, chosen only because we are interested in them, and combine them. Considering the throw of two ordinary dice, he writes instead: “For each die, there are six possible results” (Kripke 1980, p. 16, italics mine). There is no stipulation here. It is clear that there are six possible results not because we started with six properties and combined each of them with the die by means of language, producing six consistent sentences (we did not!), but because a die is what it is.​[18]​ You can start with as many properties as you want, yet the possible results will remain six. (And you can start with the property of being an alligator, yet the die could not have been an alligator.) The fact that there are six possible results for each die is taken by Kripke as the unobjectionable starting point of the whole discussion, aimed, as I said, at clarifying the notion of possible world, and, given this context, he does not even try to account for it. If pressed, however, his answer would probably be something like the following – all the text he is prefacing goes in this direction. Die A is essentially a die, as the table my computer is on is essentially a table.​[19]​ In order to be a die (of the relevant kind – see footnote 14), it has to have six faces, each showing a number from 1 to 6. When it is thrown, only one of these faces shows up, and any of them can, because of its physical geometry.​[20]​ So, the possibilities we are interested in flow from the very nature or essence of the object we have chosen, this particular die. Many more details should obviously be spelled out, but, to repeat the point, one thing seems to be clear: no stipulation is involved here.​[21]​
It remains to be seen how we get possible worlds from possibilities in the approach I am crediting to Kripke. In my opinion, the key to it is the sentence immediately following the one mentioning the possible results. Indeed, the text continues: “Hence there are thirty-six possible states of the pair of dice, as far as the numbers shown face-up are concerned, though only one of these states corresponds to the way the dice actually will come out”. A few lines later, Kripke identifies such states with (mini) possible worlds: “The thirty-six possible states of the dice are literally thirty-six ‘possible worlds’, as long as we (fictively) ignore everything about the world except the two dice and what they show”. The opening “hence” states a relation of explanatory dependence: the fact that there are (six relevant) possibilities for each die explains the fact that there are (thirty-six relevant) states of the pair of dice, namely (thirty-six mini) possible worlds. That is to say: possible worlds are accountable for in terms of (de re) possibilities. The crucial, though not explicit, notion at work here seems to me to be that of compossibility. It is because each of the six relevant possibilities for A is compossible with each of the six relevant possibilities for B that there are thirty-six relevant mini possible worlds concerning them. According to my interpretation, then, possible worlds, so useful from a technical point of view, are nothing more than combinations of possibilities.​[22]​ For this reason, whoever is not suspicious of possibilities should not be suspicious of possible worlds.
Now, I have just mentioned combinations of possibilities. In my opinion, such an appeal to combinations is what is responsible for Ballarin’s reading: they have mistakenly been taken as model theoretic, that is, arbitrary linguistically induced combinations. Two considerations are in order here. Firstly, the combinations are not free. If in the case of the two dice each of the relevant possibilities for A is compossible with each of the relevant possibilities for B, this is not the rule. For example, both Kripke and I might have been Pope on July 18th, 2001, but the two possibilities seem not to be compossible: there would not be a possible world where both Kripke and I are Pope on July 18th, 2001. In other words, the nature of the properties involved (in this case, that of being Pope on July 18th, 2001) limits the range of admissible combinations. Secondly and more importantly, the combinations are not, in any case, those which are appealed to in the MTI framework. There, objects and properties are combined to generate possibilities. Here, possible instantiations of properties by objects are combined with other possible instantiations of properties by objects to generate possible worlds. No combination of the suggested type is involved at the explanatory level, that of possibilities. Hence, no combinatorial interpretation of modality should be attributed to Kripke. Moreover, where combinations make their appearance, at the explained level – that of possible worlds –, they are not the right kind of combinations: they are not free, arbitrary, linguistically induced combinations.
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^1	 Notes Ballarin 2004. Note, however, that Ballarin is not alone in claiming to have found ambivalences in Kripke’s approach to modality. In a recent, unpublished work (of which I was a discussant at a meeting at UCLA in February 2008), for example, Joseph Almog goes a long way in this direction. More generally, I have the feeling that many others are at least perplexed by Kripke’s conspicuous appeal to possible worlds in his account (students usually are!).
^2	  In this vein, Kripke writes: “It is better ..., to avoid confusion, not to say, ‘In some possible world, Humphrey would have won’ but rather, simply, ‘Humphrey might have won’. The apparatus of possible worlds has (I hope) been very useful as far as the set-theoretic model-theory of quantified modal logic is concerned, but has encouraged philosophical pseudo-problems and misleading pictures” (Kripke 1980, p. 48n).
^3	  Quine 1947. See also Quine 1953a and 1953b.
^4	  For some other arguments leading to the same conclusion, see Martens 2006.
^5	  With regard to this, Ballarin credits MTI with a principle she calls “the Stipulability of Modal Predicates” (pp. 621-622).
^6	  As I said, the father of this kind of approach is Carnap, who took as an explicatum of the notion of necessary truth that of L-truth, i.e., truth in any state-description, where a state-description is “a class of sentences ... which contains for every atomic sentence either this sentence or its negation, but not both, and no other sentences”. According to him, “the state-descriptions represent Leibniz’ possible worlds”, because each of them “gives a complete description of a possible state of the universe of individuals with respect to all properties and relations expressed by predicates” of the language (Carnap 1956, p. 9). According to Ballarin, Ruth Barcan Marcus, Terence Parsons, and David Kaplan resorted to approaches of the same kind when they tried to disprove Quine and show that quantified modal logic is not committed to essentialism. Though considerably more refined from a conceptual point of view (see Ballarin 2005), the formal semantics that Kripke provided for modal languages in the late fifties and early sixties exhibits the same general traits (at least in that it treats the modal operators as quantifiers over possible worlds). What is at stake here is precisely the role which this semantics plays in Naming and Necessity: does Kripke take it as the basis for explaining modality and reducing modal talk? Ballarin’s answer is: sometimes. Mine is: not at all. (Actually, even with regard to the others one should proceed with extreme caution, as Tim Williamson pointed out to me: “I wonder whether Marcus, Parsons and Kaplan really resorted to MTI in replying to Quine. For example, Parsons in ‘Essentialism and Quantified Modal Logic’ [Parsons 1969] uses the model theory as a mathematical device to show that quantified modal logic has no theorems of a certain kind, but that doesn't show that his own preference wasn't for MNI. It takes much more than that to be a Carnapian about modality” (personal communication).)
^7	  In this regard, Ballarin writes: “The MNI framework grounds necessity in essential predications of real entities, and so in actual nonmodal truths” (p. 634 n. 48). In passing, let us note that the phrase “x’s actual state” in (e) (and, less relevantly, in (f)) is perhaps slightly misleading. What is “logically prior” is not the actual state (the how) of a res, but its nature (the what), and some of its connections with other res. For two different ways of developing the MNI framework, see Almog 1991 and 1996, and Fine 1994. See also Simchen 2006.
^8	  Ballarin immediately comments: “Coming from Kripke’s pen, this must strike us as rather surprising: What has happened to all of Kripke’s a posteriori-based necessities?” (p. 622). If this is so, why not suspect that, perhaps contrary to appearances, his approach to the dice example is not quasi-Carnapian?
^9	  Working in this Carnapian way, we are following Kripke’s suggestion of ignoring “the fact that one or both dice might not have existed”. In other words, we are assuming that the domain of each world is the same.
^10	  In a (reproduced) part of the dice passage, Kripke mentions “our original intuitions of possibility”. He appears to take them very seriously.
^11	  See Carnap 1952.
^12	  For Ballarin’s partial acknowledgment of this, see Ballarin 2005, pp. 278-279.
^13	  In this regard, see especially Quine 1951, section 4 (“Semantical Rules”). The revised form of the article, published in Quine 1961, contains a paragraph explicitly discussing Carnap’s notion of meaning postulate (p. 35).
^14	  It has been suggested to me by an anonymous referee that perhaps the sentence that introduces the dice example, “Two ordinary dice (call them die A and die B) are thrown”, might be seen as a resort to “meaning postulates or other linguistic (rather than object-related) facts”. Indeed, does not the word “ordinary” mean here six-sided? If this is so, it could be claimed that the sentence “analytically implies that certain combinatorial possibilities are excluded from the start, without this exclusion being de re in any serious sense”. To this, I would reply that “ordinary” means just ordinary, and that it is because of what dice are that ordinary dice are six-sided (see footnote 21 below). So, it is true that certain combinations are excluded from the start, but they are excluded from the start just because the objects with which it has been decided to start are instances of a certain kind, that of the ordinary dice: no linguistic stipulation seems to be at work here. Note, incidentally, that the word “ordinary” is required to select a specific kind, since there are non-ordinary dice that, by their very nature (having been created to play games different from the usual ones), are eight or ten-sided (after reading an earlier version of this paper, a friend of mine even gave me two). Another rather extreme line of defence for Ballarin’s interpretation was put forward to me, as a philosophical exercise (the author seemed to agree on the gist of my paper), during a discussion after a public presentation of this argument: perhaps Kripke, in stating that there are 36 possible worlds in the case we are interested in, was intending to say that there are 36 possible worlds satisfying a particular condition (two and only two numbers, one per die, have to be displayed face-up), without denying that all the other worlds (those where at least one die shows more, or less, than one number face-up) are also possible. Actually, this would reconcile Kripke’s dice passage with MTI. However, ascribing to Kripke the belief that there is a possible world where die A and die B both display all their six numbers face-up, yielding a total throw of forty-two, sounds very odd. As I have already remarked, he appears to take “our original intuitions of possibility” very seriously. 
^15	  Actually, this contradicts tenet (b) of MTI only under the assumption that in the “exercise” we make no obscure metaphysical commitment to dice as bundles of qualities either. But is there any doubt about this? 
^16	  In an article about Kripke’s contribution to philosophy, Robert Stalnaker convincingly argues that “the motivation and commitments of the [possible worlds] framework are more methodological and conceptual than they are metaphysical”, and that its adoption should “be understood not as an attempt to provide an ontological foundation for a reduction of modal notions, but as an attempt to formulate a theoretical language in which modal discourse can be regimented, its structure revealed, equivocation diagnosed and avoided”. What is more, he adds that “the primitive resources of the possible worlds framework are explained in ordinary modal language” (Stalnaker 1997, pp. 168-170). For a defence of the claim that any philosopher who accepts the standard model-theoretic semantics for modal languages should provide a clarification of the notion of possible world (as I am claiming Kripke does in the dice passage) see Plantinga 1974, pp. 125-128, and Melia 2003, pp. 60-62. 
^17	  The ‘previously’ is not only logical but also temporal. In this context, it is important not to forget that the preface to Naming and Necessity was written eight years after the main text, and that the author recommended readers not to read it first. Instead, they should “return to it for clarification (if necessary) after they have read the main text” (Kripke 1980, p. 3). Now, as Ballarin maintains, too, the main text contains the first articulation of the MNI framework, which “grounds necessity in essential predications of real entities”. I have to add that some caution is required with regard to this. As Joseph Almog pointed out to me, there is no spelt-out notion of essence at work in Naming and Necessity, and it could even be claimed that Kripke is a modal primitivist, to use an expression introduced in deRosset 2005. In what follows, I shall assume that something like essences (or, perhaps better, natures) grounding possibilities and necessities is at least hinted at in Kripke’s book. However, I wish to stress that the disagreement with Ballarin is not about this.
^18	  To my ear, there is a striking consonance here with the following passage from Naming and Necessity: “So, we do not begin with worlds ..., and then ask about criteria of transworld identification; on the contrary, we begin with the objects, which we have, and can identify, in the actual world. We can then ask whether certain things might have been true of the objects” (Kripke 1980, p. 53).
^19	  Speaking of a specific table located in the room where he was lecturing, Kripke writes: “if the very block of wood from which the table was made had instead been made into a vase, the table never would have existed. So (roughly) being a table seems to be an essential property of the table” (Kripke 1980, p. 115 n. 57).
^20	  It has been objected to me that this is not true of loaded dice (for example, dice which will never show number 6 face-up). This is a mistake. It is not reasonable to assume that being loaded is an essential property of them. Accordingly, any loaded die can show number 6 face-up. It does so in those worlds where it is not loaded.
^21	  If I had to expand on this, I would say that the kind of the dice is a social one, generated by a game whose rules are socially codified. In this frame, what makes a die what it is is its being suitable for playing dice. Since the rules do not allow dice to show number 7 face-up, no dice can show number 7 face-up.
^22	  For hints at (slightly different) accounts of possible worlds in terms of compossibility, see Adams 1974, pp. 225-230, Plantinga 1974, pp. 44-45, and Plantinga 1976, p. 107.
